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We report a free-space quantum key distribution system designed for high-speed key transmission in
urban areas. Clocking the system at gigahertz frequencies and efficiently filtering background enables
higher secure key rates than those previously achieved by similar systems. The transmitter and receiver
are located in two separate buildings 300 m apart in downtownMadrid and they exchange secure keys at
rates up to 1Mbps. The system operates in full bright daylight conditions with an average secure key rate
of 0.5 Mbps and 24 h stability without human intervention. © 2013 Optical Society of America
OCIS codes: (270.5568) Quantum cryptography; (060.2605) Free-space optical communication.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] uses physical
properties of single photons, such as polarization
or phase, to securely distribute cryptographic keys
between two parties. It emerged as an attempt to
solve the problem of key distribution by uniquely
detecting the presence of an eavesdropper in the
communication channel via the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle.
QKD has greatly evolved since the first experi-
mental demonstration in 1992 [2] and distances
up to 144 km in free space [3] and 250 km in optical
fiber [4] have successfully been achieved. Free-space
quantum communications for long-haul applications
will play an important role in securing earth-to-
satellite links [5]. For shorter-distance applications
located in urban scenarios, free-space QKD could be
an interesting alternative for commercial, govern-
ment, and financial institutions that wish to be
securely connected to the backbone of metropolitan
networks without the licensees required in fiber
optics solutions and with higher portability and
flexibility in terms of installation.
One critical issue when using the atmosphere as
the transmission channel is that extraneous back-
ground light can couple into the receiver leading to
an increased error rate. Some free-space QKD sys-
tems that implement efficient methods to reduce
background radiation, enabling the operation in day-
light conditions, have been demonstrated in [6–10].
Another aspect of free-space QKD implementations
that needs special attention is turbulence in the
atmosphere, which can lead to beam spreading, beam
wander, and scintillation at the receiver. The effect of
such link fluctuations on free-space decoy-state QKD
has been recently studied in [11].
In [12] a thorough review of latest most representa-
tive free-space QKD experiments is performed. It
shows that, though great advances have been reported
[13], the transmission bit rates of present experimen-
tal realizations of free-spaceQKDare still low, limiting
their implementation for real-world applications.
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Two low-absorption atmospheric spectral windows
in the near-infrared regions of λ ∼ 850 nm and λ ∼
1550 nm are usually considered for free-space optical
communications. Although the latter wavelength has
an associated higher transmission and it is slightly
less affected by turbulence effects and backscatter-
ing, detection technology must also be considered. In-
deed, while InGaAs single-photon detectors have
greatly improved their performance in terms of the
maximum repetition rate they can operate at (from
megahertz to gigahertz) [14], they are still outper-
formed by commercially available Si single-photon
detectors (Si-SPADs) in critical parameters, such as
dark-count rate, detection efficiency, and afterpulse
probability. Likewise, superconducting single-photon
detectors, although exhibiting low timing jitters and
dark-count rates at λ ∼ 850 nm [15], still exhibit lower
detection efficiencies than Si-SPADs, and must be
cooled down to temperatures as low as 3K. Therefore,
a sourcewavelengthof λ ∼ 850 nminconjunctionwith
Si-SPADs as the single-photon detectors was chosen
as the most efficient and practical solution to achieve
gigahertz clock rates [16].
In this paper, we present a free-space QKD system
that implements the B92 protocol [17] at gigahertz
clock frequencies over a distance of 300 m in Madrid.
Several experiments have been performed to deter-
mine the system’s optimum clock frequency, the influ-
ence of solar radiation, and the system’s stability and
robustness tomisalignment. TheQKD system and its
characterizationwill be described in detail in the next
two sections.
2. Experimental Setup
The emitter setup of the proposed free-space QKD
system is shown in Fig. 1. The purpose of the emitter
module is to send out single photons carrying infor-
mation codified in their polarization state. In order to
emit individual photons the sender heavily attenu-
ates a laser source, thus emitting the so-called weak
coherent pulses that follow a Poisson distribution. To
achieve high transmission rates Alice uses a fast gig-
ahertz pulse pattern generator in conjunction with
vertical-cavity surface emitting lasers (VCSELs)
controlled by high-speed drivers, which can operate
at several gigabits per second. Both VCSELs emit at
a central wavelength of 848 nm, with an FWHM
spectral bandwidth of 45 pm. The driver of each
VCSEL contains an automatic power control cir-
cuitry, which maintains an average optical power
output and ensures a stable wavelength emission
over changes in temperature and laser properties.
Each laser output is coupled into a single-mode
optical fiber at λ ∼ 850 nm, which spatially filters
the beam ensuring that only one spatial mode is
propagated. Each fiber output is then connected to
a fiber-coupled attenuator to reduce the average
number of photons per pulse to μ ∼ 0.1, which guar-
antees that only 0.5% of the emitted pulses contain
more than one photon per pulse. Higher values of μ
can be used if a decoy-state protocol is implemented,
as reported in [18]. The output of each attenuator is
collimated and launched into two high extinction-
ratio polarizers to produce the polarization states
required by the B92 protocol. These states are
combined by a nonpolarizing beam splitter cube.
Timing synchronization between emitter and
receiver is carried out by another laser beam emit-
ting at λ ∼ 1550 nm, which conveys Alice’s internal
clock signal to Bob. The use of a classical channel op-
erating at a different wavelength in parallel with the
quantum channel has already been implemented in
[9,19]. If done with sufficient timing precision, this
technique does not decrease the speed of the system,
since no further software compensation is needed
due to emitter and receiver having exactly the same
Fig. 1. Picture (a) and diagram (b) of Alice’s module. V0 and V1 are two VCSELs emitting at λ ∼ 850 nm; VS is a third VCSEL emitting at
λ ∼ 1550 nm, which is used for the timing synchronization and is combined with the λ ∼ 850 nm beam by a broadband pellicle beam splitter
(PL); A0 and A1 are two fiber-optic attenuators; C0, C1, and CS are three fiber-coupled collimators; P0 and P1 are two high extinction-ratio
polarizers; BS is a nonpolarizing beam splitter; L1 and L2 are two achromatic doublet lenses that constitute the output telescope; andM1
and M2 are two high-reflectivity mirrors.
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clock. The synchronization signal is then combined
with the two λ ∼ 850 nm beams by a broadband pel-
licle beam splitter. Both λ ∼ 850 nm beams are then
collimated and expanded to a diameter of ∼40 mmby
using a set of two achromatic lenses. The transmitter
is mounted on a high-precision gimbal system, which
facilitates the alignment and pointing with the
receiver.
The receiver is located at approximately 300 m
from the transmitter. This unit consists of a tele-
scope, the receiver’s optics, two silicon single-photon
detectors, an InGaAs photodetector and a timestamp
card. A photograph and a diagram of Bob’s module
are shown in Fig. 2.
The beam coming from Alice is focused by a
Schmidt–Cassegrain telescope with an aperture
diameter of 25.4 cm. The receiver’s optics have been
designed to be directly coupled to the output of the
telescope. A half-wave plate at the input of the
receiver’s optics is used to align the incident electric
field of the two nonorthogonal states with the trans-
mission axis of Bob’s dichroic mirror to minimize
degradation of the polarization states. The beam
at λ ∼ 850 nm and the “synchronization beam” at λ ∼
1550 nm are then spectrally discriminated by a
dichroic mirror. The solar background radiation is
filtered by using a narrow bandpass spectral filter
centered at λ ∼ 850 nm.
The discrimination of the two nonorthogonal
states encrypting the binary states “1” and “0” is
achieved by using two high-extinction (>10000∶1)
polarizers. The procedure is as follows: Bob performs
measurements on the photons with either of the two
polarizers (see Fig. 2), which sometimes fail to detect
a “click” (the polarizer is oriented to block the pho-
tons of the unwanted polarization state), but when
a measurement succeeds it always provides the bit
correctly—note that under these measurement
schemes if Alice transmits a “0” there is no possibility
(except for errors due to noise and device imperfec-
tions) that Bob measures a “1”, i.e., that he gets a
“click” in channel 1, and vice versa. That is, if Bob
chooses the wrong polarizer to measure a photon,
he will not measure anything, and therefore no
errors will be introduced in his bit sequence. Hence,
there is no need for reconciliation of basis sets
between Alice and Bob to discriminate ambiguous
measurements since the string of bits measured by
Bob is directly the sifted key, which simplifies this
protocol when compared to the BB84 protocol [1].
After the polarizers, the discriminated signals are
coupled into multimode fibers, which spatially filter
the background radiation collected by the receiver.
The photons are then detected by two PerkinElmer
SPCM-AQR-12 actively quenched Si-SPADs with a
single-photon detection efficiency of ηdet ∼ 0.32, and
a dark-count rate of ∼200 Hz. The output of each
detector is connected to each data channel of the
timestamp card, which is used to record the arrival
times of the detected photons. The synchronization
signal, which is detected by an InGaAs photodetector
and amplified by a fast transimpedance amplifier, is
connected to the clock input of the timestamp card. It
must also be stressed that the detectors used in this
work have been the target of a series of attacks by
using bright illumination [20]. No satisfactory solu-
tion has yet been devised, which emphasizes that a
more general security proof incorporating imperfect
detectors is needed [21].
A short “known sequence” is sent by Alice at the
beginning of every key. This sequence is used by
Bob to identify the beginning of his sifted key. Bob
Fig. 2. Picture (a) and diagram (b) of Bob’s module. SPD, single photon detectors and APD, an avalanche photodiode; L1, L2, and L3 are
three achromatic doublet lenses used to couple the signal into the optical fibers.
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sends Alice the bit positions where he detected a pho-
ton, and Alice then generates her sifted key from this
information. To test for eavesdropping Alice ran-
domly chooses a fraction of the sifted key as test
events. For those test events, Alice publicly broad-
casts their positions and binary values. Bob then
computes the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the
test events, i.e., the ratio of wrong events (those
for which his and Alice’s value disagree) to the total
number of detected events. If the computed error rate
is above a certain value, which for our system is 8%,
no secure key can be extracted from the sifted key
after the error correction and privacy amplification
processes.
Sender and receiver are isolated from stray back-
ground light by being covered in blackout material.
This reduces the amount of stray light that is coupled
in the receiver by more than 1 order of magnitude.
3. Results and Discussion
Experiments were performed with emitter and
receiver situated at a distance of 300 m in the city
center of Madrid. The transmitter was located in
the sixth floor of the Institute of Agricultural Scien-
ces, and the receiver in the third floor of the Informa-
tion Security Institute, both belonging to CSIC.
All information shared by Alice and Eve, IAE,
needs to be subtracted from Alice and Bob’s sifted se-
quences to generate the final secret key. In our case
we have considered the worst case scenario where
Eve performs two types of attacks on the channel si-
multaneously: the unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) attack [22] and the photon number splitting
(PNS) attack [23,24]. It is known that the B92 pro-
tocol is vulnerable to theUSD with a lossless channel
attack, whereby Eve can gain 100% of the key if the
loss of the channel is ≥71% [25]. If the loss of the
transmission channel is lower, Alice and Bob can dis-
till a secret key, albeit at the cost of discarding the
information gained by Eve through privacy amplifi-
cation. In our case, the loss of the link is 13.2% at
300 m, allowing an eavesdropper to intercept and
perform a USD attack to 18.7% of the photons sent
by Alice without being detected. If Eve attacks a
higher percentage than this, she will generate a loss
that she will not be able to compensate for. By per-
forming a USD attack to 18.7% of the photons trans-
mitted by Alice, Eve obtains 29.3% of them
unambiguously [26], which corresponds to 5.5% of
the emitted photons. The remaining attacked pho-
tons, 13.2%, are detected ambiguously, and thus
Eve blocks them not to increase the error rate. She
now replaces the channel by a lossless one and sends
the photons she detected deterministically. Bob does
not notice anything anomalous and Eve remains un-
detected. In addition, we have considered that Eve
also performs the PNS attack to all the multiphoton
pulses transmitted by Alice. In our case, the informa-
tion shared by Alice and Eve is then given by
IAEtotal  IAEUSD  IAEPNS; (1)
where IAEUSD is the information shared by Alice and
Eve, assuming Eve performs the above mentioned
USD attack, and is given by [26]
IAEUSD  0.1871 − cos θ; (2)
θ being the relative angle between the polarization
quantum states (typically 45°). IAEPNS is the infor-
mation shared by Alice and Eve assuming a PNS at-
tack is taking place, and corresponds to the fraction
of tagged bits,Δ [27], or bits received by Bob that may
have leaked all of their signal information to an
eavesdropper without introducing any error. In that
case Δ is given by
IAEPNS  Δ 
pmulti
pexp
 1 − 1 μ exp−μ
1 − exp−ημ ; (3)
pmulti being the probability that a multiphoton pulse
is emitted by Alice, pexp the probability for a non-
empty pulse being detected by Bob, μ the average
photon number per pulse, and η the transmittance
of the channel and receiver combined. Therefore,
the final secure key rate (Rnet) per second is given by
Rnet  Rsifted

1 − IAEtotal − f eH2e − 1 − IAEtotal
×H2

e
1 − IAEtotal

; (4)
where e is the QBER, f e is the efficiency of the error
correction process (which we have assumed to be 1.2),
and H2 is the binary entropy function. Therefore,
to guarantee security, the sifted key rate (Rsifted) is
reduced by f eH2e after error correction and by
IAEtotal  1 − IAEtotalH2e∕1 − IAEtotal in privacy
amplification.
The system’s optimum clock frequency was estab-
lished by the measurement of Rsifted and the error
rate at different clock frequencies, and Rnet was esti-
mated following Eq. (4). The experiment was carried
out at night to eliminate the influence of the solar
background radiation on the QBER. Rsifted is directly
proportional to the clock frequency as more pulses
containing photons are emitted. However, the QBER
increases with clock frequency due to intersymbol
interference, i.e., more photons are detected in
incorrect time windows. This is due to the combined
timing jitter of the whole QKD system, though the
maximum contribution is caused by the detectors—
typically the timing jitter of the detectors ranges
between 600 ps and 1 ns [28], whereas the timing jit-
ter of the emitter and the timestamp card combined
was less than 200 ps. Rnet increases with clock fre-
quency for low values of the QBER, since the effect
of higher Rsifted is dominant. However, for higher
error rates, Rnet starts to decay as more bits need to
be discarded than those gained from Rsifted. From
Fig. 3 it can be seen that the optimum clock fre-
quency which provides the highest Rnet is 1.5 GHz,
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with a QBER of 2.17% and an Rnet of 0.93 Mbps. All
the following experiments were clocked at 1.5 GHz.
As Eq. (3) shows, pexp increases linearly with the
channel and receiver’s transmittance η, reaching Δ
rapidly unity, which means no untagged bits are left
to generate a secret key. Therefore, to enhance the
number of untagged bits, η needs to be as high as pos-
sible and μ ideally should be chosen roughly propor-
tional to η. Measurements were made to establish the
QBER and Rnet for different values of μ at a fixed
clock frequency of 1.5 GHz. Decreasing μ decreases
the probability (given by Poisson distribution) of
finding more than one photon in a nonempty pulse,
and therefore, the information gained by Eve in the
case of a PNS attack taking place (IAEPNS). However,
it also decreases the detected photon rate at Bob, i.e.,
Rsifted. Hence there is a trade-off between security
and bit rate. As Fig. 4 shows, the highest Rnet was
obtained for an optimum mean photon number of
0.1 photons per pulse.
The influence of the background due to solar radi-
ation on the performance of the systemwas also char-
acterized by measuring the QBER, Rnet, and the
background rate (Fig. 5). The experiment was carried
out under bright sunny conditions (July 31th 2012:
sunset starting at 21:30). The increase of the solar
background from 19:00 to 21:00 is due to straight
incidence of solar rays hitting the emitter, which kept
the QBER high for this period. From then on, back-
ground and QBER decrease coinciding with the
sunset, and the secret key rate Rnet then reaches
its maximum at 1.04 Mbps. Before sunset, a mean
secure key rate of 0.62 Mbps in full bright solar
conditions was demonstrated.
The stability of the link was also tested. The QBER
and Rsifted were measured every 30 min for a continu-
ous period of 24 h under similar conditions to the pre-
vious experiments (24th of July), and the Rnet was
inferred for each measurement using Eq. (4). The
QBERandRnet are represented inFig. 6. It shows that
the system runs continuously for 24 hwithout human
interaction with a QBER between 2% and 7.8%. The
maximum measured secure key rate was 1.01 Mbps,
the minimum was 4.5 kbps, and the average value
throughout thewhole daywas 0.5Mbps. The system’s
performance proves very stable, with Rsifted and Rnet
reaching 87% and 80%, respectively, of their initial
values from the previous day when the experiment
started. The drop in Rnet was due to a higher back-
ground (caused by slightly different weather condi-
tions) and hence higher QBER.
The resistance of the system to vibrations and
other sources of misalignment was tested by pur-
posely misaligning the emitter from the receiver
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Fig. 3. Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), sifted bit rate,
Rsifted, and secure key rate, Rnet, (right-hand axis) against clock
frequency for a 300 m optical link.
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from an optimized alignment at an established trans-
mission at 1.5 GHz. Figure 7 shows that it was only
after 90% of misalignment (this means that Bob has
lost 90% of the initial Rsifted when the system is
perfectly aligned) that the QBER reached values
higher than 6%.
Relative pointing deviations, mainly due to build-
ing sway and thermal fluctuations, were measured to
cause a decrease in the sifted bit rate of 13.4% after a
24 h period. The misalignment between emitter and
receiver, measured as a percentage of Bob’s sifted bit
rate, was characterized in Fig. 7, which shows that it
is only after a misalignment of at least 60% that the
QBER increases slightly (0.3%) and after 70% that
this increase is more noticeable. This tendency shows
that the system could potentially be aligned for 4 or 5
days without external intervention at this distance.
Nevertheless, since emitter and receiver are moun-
ted on precise gimbal platforms for their alignment,
a tracking process with high-precision motors will
be implemented so that in future experiments such
effects can be compensated for.
Although the QKD system presented in this paper
has only been experimentally tested for a 300 m link,
it has been designed to withstand longer distances.
Considering the attenuation on the atmospheric
channel with the same urban aerosol conditions of
this work (0.62 transmittance at a wavelength of
850 nm) and a regime of intermediate turbulence
(refractive index structure constant C2n≈10−15), our
simulations showed that the system could poten-
tially operate up to a distance of 4.5 km, with a secret
key rate at night of 18 kbps. For high turbulence
regime (C2n≈10−14) the distance drops to 3.4 km.
Regarding the transmission speed of the QKD sys-
tem, the maximum secret key rateRnet (1.04 Mbps) is
more than 1 order of magnitude higher than those of
other systems operating at the same range of distan-
ces [8,13], and the corresponding Rsifted (1.8 Mbps)
more than 4 times the highest value reported to date
for field experiments [19].
4. Conclusions and Future Work
A high-bit-rate free-space QKD system for urban
applications has been reported. The modulation of
high-bandwidth laser diodes with a fast frequency
generator in Alice in conjunction with a synchroniza-
tion at a different wavelength permits 1 order of
magnitude faster key generation than those previ-
ously achieved. Spatial and spectral filtering of the
background radiation, together with light-tight
shielding of emitter and receiver, enables full bright
daylight operation with average secret key rates
reaching 0.5 Mbps. At nighttime conditions secure
key rates of up to 1.04 Mbps were achieved. The
stability of the system was also tested during a 24 h
experiment without human interaction, and after
this period the sifted and secret key rates obtained
were 87% and 80% of the initial values.
The system is currently being upgraded to imple-
ment active pointing and tracking, thus permitting
continuous operation.
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